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The emergence of the Asian tiger countries and the participation of the ex-Communist countries in
world trade has reduced the equilibrium price of labor in western Europe and elsewhere. However,
the actual price of labor hardly reacts, because the welfare state's minimum replacement incomes are
fixed. The rigidity of wages causes pathological overreactions of the European economy in terms of
excessive capital exports, excessive immigration and excessive structural change towards the capital
intensive export sectors. The overreactions cause unemployment, sluggish growth, a current account
surplus and a high export volume, but may prevent gains from trade.   Moving from a system of wage
replacement incomes to one that pays wage subsidies would enable a more efficient economic reaction
that would not jeopardize social goals but bring about more employment, growth and gains from trade.
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Globalization, the Fall of the Iron Curtain and Factor Price Convergence 
The fall of the Iron Curtain was an unparalleled shock to Western economies in general 
and Europe in particular. Suddenly the 28% of mankind who previously had lived in the 
Communist states began to participate in the market game in the same way as the 15% 
OECD people had done before. And, coincidentally, India has now also decided to 
participate, which increases the new entrants into the world market economy to 45%.  
  While this development is likely to produce gains from trade for most countries 
involved and substantially raise the standard of living of a substantial part of mankind, it 
is not without problems for the West. The main difficulty is the process of factor price 
convergence. Gains from trade always accompany the process of price and wage 
convergence, because the original differences in prices and wages initiate the arbitrage 
and specialization processes that are the reason for these gains. Thus there will always 
be groups in society that lose, despite the gains to be achieved in the aggregate.  
 
  In theory, assuming no frictions and transportation costs, the aggregate gains 
from trade reach a maximum when all wages and prices are equal and arbitrage ceases 
to be profitable. In practice, given the frictions, prices and wages will not and should 
not become identical. However, given the huge differences that we see today, they will 
converge over time. For the next half of a century it will hardly make any difference 
whether the wage convergence between China and the West will eventually lead to 







































































 Figure  1 
 
  Figure 1 shows how far the ex-Communist countries will have to go until their 
wages match those of the West. Currently, the average wage cost per hour of the eight 
east European EU accession countries is 13% of the west German wage cost, for 
example, and the Chinese wage is only 1/27. Closing the wage gap will be a positive 
experience for the ex-Communist countries, but will involve severe and painful 
adjustment processes for the West.  
  Some have downplayed the difficulties by pointing out how easy it was for the 
EU to manage Western enlargement by Spain and Portugal in the mid 1980s. However, 
these developments are not comparable, as the two countries were much more advanced   4
than the eastern European countries. Instead of the 13% ratio of the west German wage, 
their wages stood at 50% at the time of EU accession.  
  How long will convergence take? Estimates vary. If one believes in the 
convergence figure of 2% that was found by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), implying a 
half time of 35 years, east European wages will have reached 50% of German wages by 
2035. However, during the last decades, west European convergence has just been 1.1% 
p.a. implying a half time of 63 years. If east-west convergence were to proceed at the 
same speed as the internal convergence in the western part of the EU, the wages of the 
east European member countries would reach 50% of west Germany’s wages by 2054.  
 
The Forces of Factor Price Convergence 
There are various economic forces bringing about factor price convergence. The first is 
the spill-over of technological knowledge. The transfer of scientific knowledge through 
the scholarly media as well as the transfer through observation and imitation are 
powerful equalizing forces. It is true that some of this transfer can be prevented by 
patents and other intellectual property rights. However, as patents usually expire after 
30 years, the still backward countries can immediately leapfrog to the state of western 
knowledge of 30 years ago. Moreover, most of the technological knowledge of this 
world is not protected, and much knowledge is too diffuse to be patented. When a 
European company opens a factory in China, there is little to prevent the Chinese to 
build a nearly identical plant on the green field next door.  
  The second force is capital flows. Capital moves from high-wage western 
countries to low-wage eastern countries because the rate of return is higher there. The   5

































% of total population
capital creates jobs in the East and increases the demand for labour there which raises 
the wage, and the reverse process takes place in the West. Thus wages converge. 
  Germany is a country which is currently very strongly affected by this process. 
At a net investment share of only 2.9% of net domestic product (NDP), it currently 
ranks lowest among all OECD countries. In 2005, net investment was only 60 billion 
euros or 40% of aggregate savings which itself stood at 150 billion euros. 60% of 
German savings, or 90 billion euros, were sent abroad as net capital exports. 
  The third force is migration. As people migrate from low-wage to high-wage 
countries, they make labour scarcer in the former and more abundant in the latter, which 
tends to reduce the international wage differences. In Europe, migration has already 














Dotted areas: Share of foreigners, where data were available. 
   6
*) Most countries: 2001, USA: 2000, Germany: 2005. 
 
Sources: OECD (2004), Trends in International Migration: Sopemi 2003 edition, Statistisches Bundesamt 
(2006),  Leben in Deutschland – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2005; Eurostat: Population and social 




  Figure 2 gives an overview of the shares of the foreign-born population in those 
countries for which the OECD has provided data plus Germany, for which the Federal 
Statistical Office published such data for the first time in June 2006. It shows that the 
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Germany have immigration figures that resemble and, 
in the latter two cases, even exceed those of the United States. Obviously, western 
Europe is currently facing a mass immigration wave of historical dimensions.  
  To properly interpret the immigration figures note that they cannot be equated 
with the shares of foreigners, because the former also reflect the countries’ 
naturalization policies. Where available, the shares of foreigners have also been 
indicated in the diagram. In the case of the Netherlands, which has a very liberal 
naturalization policy, this share is only 4.3%, in the case of Germany it is 8.9%. The 
figures also cannot be equated with the share of the population with a migration 
background, as the children of the immigrants born in the host country are not included. 
In the case of Germany, immigrants—including their children—currently account for 
18.5% of its population.  
  A fourth force of factor price convergence is specialization. As the capital-rich 
West encounters new trade possibilities with the low-wage countries of the East, it 
retreats from labour-intensive production processes and specializes in capital-intensive 
ones, where labour typically is unskilled labour and capital includes human capital in   7
the sense of skilled labour. Conversely, the East, which is rich in labour, specializes in 
labour-intensive production. Both specialization processes also tend to reduce the wage 
gaps, as the demand for unskilled labour in the West falls while it rises in the East.  
  Specialization towards capital-intensive sectors can take place in the horizontal 
and in the vertical direction. Examples of horizontal specialization are the retreat from 
textile and leather industries and the expansion of the high-tech areas like chemistry or 
automobiles. Examples of vertical specialization are outsourcing and offshoring 
activities.  
  Outsourcing and offshoring have become particularly strong since the mid- 
1990s, because that was the time when the eastern European EU accession countries 
had overcome their transformation crises and the decisions on EU membership were 
made. West European firms have increasingly cut off the more labour intensive 
upstream parts of their production chains, shifting them to low-wage countries in the 
East. Either they themselves established plants there (offshoring) or they gave up part of 
their own intermediate production, buying the respective parts instead from other 
companies located in low-wage countries (international outsourcing). They thereby 
created jobs in the East and destroyed them in the West, pulling up wages in the former 
and depressing them in the latter, thus contributing to the process of factor price 
convergence.  
  The process has been observable in most EU countries. Practically everywhere 
has production depth declined in the sense that the share of the manufacturing sector’s 
value added in its own output has fallen.  
  Due to its geographical and cultural proximity to the East and its own high 
wages, Germany has been affected particularly strongly. There is hardly any German   8
car whose domestic share in production cost reaches 50%. Even exports as such, 
including the exports of non-manufactured goods, increasingly consist of imports. From 
1991 to 2001, the share of imported intermediate goods in exports rose from 27% to 
39%, and at the margin this share is already 53%. From each additional euro that 
German companies earn in exports, they need 53 cents to buy the additional imports 
needed to produce these exports. Germany is developing towards what I have called a 
bazaar economy (see Statistisches Bundesamt 2004, Sinn 2004 and 2006).  
  The labour market implications of these and other flight reactions have been 
enormous, as can be seen by the sharp decline in manufacturing employment since the 
collapse of Communism. From 1991 to 2003, manufacturing employment declined by 
11% in the Netherlands, about 12% in France, 23% in Great Britain, 26% in Japan and 
27% in Germany, the dubious OECD champion in this regard.  
 
Gains from Trade and Specialization: Theory and Reality 
Despite the obvious hardship resulting from job losses, these losses cannot in 
themselves be considered a sign of welfare losses for the West. After all, they could be 
the necessary counterpart of a gradual process of sector shift that normally is associated 
with gains from trade, specialization and an improved international division of labour. 
There could be an equal number of jobs created elsewhere in the economy, 
compensating for the losses. This at least is the typical economics textbook view.
  Unfortunately, however, reality does not always fit the textbook view. One 
example of where it definitely does not fit is Germany. As shown in Table 1, full-time 
equivalent employment in German manufacturing declined by 1.21 million in the ten 
years from 1995 to 2005. However, in the whole rest of the economy including services,   9
construction and high-tech areas, no jobs were created in net terms that could have 
compensated for these losses. On the contrary, even these sectors lost 150,000 jobs in 
full-time equivalents. So, where did the manufacturing workers go? There is only one 
possibility left. They went to the welfare state, into state-financed unemployment. That 
was the improvement in the division of labour à l’Allemande. The dirty industrial jobs 
were abolished, but nothing was created in exchange!  
 
Improvement in the Division of Labour? The German Case  
1995 – 2005,  million full-time equivalents 
Manufacturing Industry  -1.21  
Rest of the Economy  -0.15  
Into Non-employment  1.36  
 
Table 1  
 
  This development pattern is so remote from what the textbook predicts that it 
would be absurd to interpret it as an improvement in the international division of labour. 
It rather seems to be accompanied by welfare losses. As more and more people stop 
working, they stop making contributions to GDP and national income. Small wonder 
that Germany was the European growth laggard in the period under consideration, next 
to Italy.  
  While no comparable data for other European countries are available, it may be 
suspected that the problems described for Germany may also be occurring there. After 
all, even Western Europe on average had a miserable growth performance during the 
last ten years. There was no comparable region and no continent in the whole world   10
whose growth performance was similarly disappointing. From 1995 to 2004 the world 
economy grew by 30%, east Asia grew by 87%, the U.S. by 34%, Latin America by 
26% and even Africa grew by 31%, while the old EU countries grew only by 23%.  
 
Rigid Wages and the Welfare State 
What went wrong? That is the obvious question one must ask after realising the 
problematic reactions of the labour market. 
  The answer is that the European labour market is rigid, impeding the textbook 
type wage adjustments, and with rigid wages, unemployment results.  
  The rigidity stems, to some extent, from the strong unions that have not allowed 
wage reductions despite the fact that the participation of the ex-Communist countries 
has reduced the equilibrium wage of unskilled labour in Europe. To another extent, it 
stems from the welfare state that offers generous wage replacement incomes.  
  All Western European countries, perhaps with the exception of Great Britain and 
Ireland, have social systems that are based on the idea of the state paying money in the 
case no labour income is available. Whether one thinks of social assistance, 
unemployment compensation or early retirement benefits: the rule is always that the 
government provides an income under the condition that people do not work and 
withdraws this income to the extent they do. The government acts as a competitor to 
private business in the labour market, paying a wage for doing nothing, a replacement 
wage. This replacement wage creates a minimum wage demand that the private sector 
must exceed in order to find people who are willing to work. If, however, the labour 
productivity of the people involved is not high enough to make the employer pay this 
wage, unemployment results. Evidently, the gradual expansion of replacement incomes   11
as part of the expansion of the welfare state in recent decades contributed significantly 
to the rise in structural unemployment (Phelps, 1994). 
  This is a particular problem for the unskilled, whose wage is significantly 
pushed above the market clearing level by this effect. However, it extends also to more 
skilled wage categories because certain natural distances between the categories have to 
be maintained. As a result of replacement incomes, the whole wage distribution is 
compressed from below like a harmonica held with the left hand and pushed upward 
with the right. Unemployment is created up to the middle income ranges, though at 
progressively lower rates. Small wonder that in nearly all EU countries unemployment 
among the unskilled is higher than that among medium-skill levels, which in turn 
exceeds that among people with a university education.  
  Wage rigidity is a clue to understanding the difference between the textbook 
prediction of gains from trade and the reality of increasing unemployment and also for 
evaluating the adjustments one can observe.  
  There are three different conceptual levels from which the structural changes can 
be assessed. One is the business perspective. From a business point of view, the 
economic reactions to trade and international wage differences obviously make sense, 
for otherwise they would not be taken. This is a trivial truth that no one can deny. Take 
the German automobile industry, for example. Because it can have its parts cheaply 
produced in Eastern Europe, it manages to stay competitive and make profits.  
  Another level of judgement is economic second best. Given that the wages are 
cut in stone and do not react to the forces of globalization, it is probably good that firms 
react the way they do, because otherwise they would go bankrupt, unable to maintain 
any employment. Capital deepening and sector shifts towards capital-intensive   12
production, including outsourcing and offshoring the upstream parts of the production 
chain, are welfare-improving reactions to the forces of globalization when wages cannot 
be changed. They go along with unemployment, but there would be even more 
unemployment without these reactions.  
  The last and most important level of judgement is economic first best, and this is 
the textbook view discussed above, claiming that trade generates gains with all 
countries involved thanks to an improved international division of labour. This view 
obviously is not correct for a country like Germany, as was demonstrated above.  
  In summary, therefore, one can say that the European economy’s reactions to 
international low-wage competition are efficient from the perspective of firms and from 
an economic second best perspective, given the rigidities of the welfare state, but that 




Many politicians and even some economists face substantial difficulties when they are 
asked to evaluate the European economy’s reactions to the globalized world, including 
the new trade possibilities with the ex-Communist countries. These difficulties result 
from the fact that the distortions in economic reactions resulting from rigid wages 
resemble efficient economic reactions in qualitative terms, but go too far quantitatively 
if judged from the perspective of the economic first best. As the direction of economic 
reactions fits what the trade textbook predicts, many do not think there is reason to 
worry. But they are wrong, because they overlook the fact that the reactions are   13
pathologically overdrawn. Let us once again consider the forces of factor price 
convergence mentioned above to see why this is so. 
  Consider migration first. If the borders between a high-wage and a low-wage 
region are opened, people migrate from the low to the high-wage region. In principle, 
such migration is efficient, because it is driven by wage differences that in turn reflect 
marginal productivities of labour in different locations. With flexible wages, the stock 
of East European immigrants living and working in the West is determined such that the 
last migrant earns a wage increase and induces a corresponding output increase that just 
matches his migration cost. Thus, the joint GDP of the countries involved net of 
migration costs is maximized. The nationals of both countries share in this welfare gain 
by experiencing a higher income net of migration costs than before. There are obvious 
gains from trade.  
  When Western wages are rigid, above their market clearing level, this is not 
quite true, however. On the one hand, the high wages induce more than efficient 
migration. On the other hand, wage rigidity prevents the creation of new jobs for the 
immigrants. The result is immigration into unemployment. 
  Immigration into unemployment is only indirect, however. It is not the 
immigrants who become unemployed, but the nationals. The immigrants have low 
reservation wages reflecting their low wages at home, and they are not entitled to social 
benefits in the host country before they have worked there. Domestic workers, by 
contrast, have high reservation wages reflecting the high replacement incomes offered 
by the welfare state. Thus, the domestic workers are the marginal suppliers in the labour 
market determining the wage and the employment level, and the immigrants are   14
inframarginal low-wage suppliers that simply crowd out the domestic suppliers one by 
one (Sinn 2005).  
  The next topic is capital exports. Capital exports from rich Western Europe to 
the poor countries of the East can, in principle, be seen as welfare increasing 
intertemporal trade among nations. The rate of return to capital in the rich countries as 
well as the rate of time preference are above the respective values in the poor countries. 
Thus both countries gain if the rich countries lend some of their capital to the poor 
countries, be it for the purpose of investment or for the purpose of consumption 
smoothing over time.  
  However, when wages in the rich western countries are kept rigidly above their 
market clearing levels, the rate of return to capital in these countries is artificially 
reduced and more than the efficient amount of capital leaves the country, while 
unemployment increases. There is a pathological capital export (Seidel 2005).  
  Confusingly for the politicians, who are not trained economists, this capital 
export comes along with a current account surplus, since such a surplus by definition is 
a capital export. Thus the politicians even applaud the pathological overreaction as a 
sign of a high competitiveness of the domestic economy.  
  Things are similar with the specialization effects described above. Consider first 
horizontal specialization. Suppose the West, rich in human and real capital, opens up 
trade with the East, which is poor but has an abundance of unskilled labour. As 
explained above, a natural reaction of the rich countries is to give up some of their 
labour-intensive sectors so that the factors of production can move to the capital-
intensive export sectors where the rich countries have a comparative advantage. As the 
capital-intensive sectors, by definition, are unable to absorb all the workers released in   15
this process of fully absorbing the real and human capital, the sector shifts in the first 
instance cause unemployment. 
  Suppose for a moment the West has well-functioning labour markets with 
flexible wages. The initial unemployment will then lead to declining wages which 
themselves incur counter-reactions that ultimately avoid unemployment for two reasons. 
For one thing, all sectors switch to more labour intensive production techniques. For 
another, a brake is imposed on the extent of the sector shifts, as with lower wages a 
larger part of the labour intensive sectors of the economy is able to survive. The 
economy reacts efficiently in the manner described in the textbooks. 
  If, however, we take into account that wages are rigid, these two counter-
reactions cannot take place, and permanent unemployment will prevail. In particular, 
the brake on the sector shift, which an efficient economy imposes via declining wages, 
is not operative. Thus, there is a landslide shift in the economy’s sector structure from 
labour intensive import-competing to capital-intensive export sectors, causing mass 
unemployment together with a pathological overshooting of value added earned in 
exports (Sinn 2004, 2006). 
  The process is further reinforced by excessive vertical specialization from 
labour-intensive upstream to capital-intensive downstream activities, i.e. by the bazaar 
effect. Again, a flexible economy, whose wages decline following job losses, would 
also exhibit the bazaar effect to some extent. Production depth would decline and export 
quantities would increase faster than value added in exports, as described above. 
However, the wage decline would help to fine-tune the structural change by again 
imposing a brake on the development. In the absence of such a decline, with rigid wages, 
the bazaar effect, too, becomes excessive. Too large a fraction of the upstream value   16
added chains are cut off, and too much capital and labour is moving to the downstream 
sectors. Thus, value added in exports not only grows too much. What is more, the ratio 
of export quantities and value added generated in exports expands too quickly. For two 
reasons the measured export quantities are becoming too large.  
  This is particularly alarming news for a country like Germany, whose exports 
seem to perform excellently. Germany is number two in world exports of goods and 
services. In terms of goods exports alone, Germany even ranks first (WTO 2005). While 
most observers interpret the excellent German export performance as a sign of 
competitive strength, the above analysis at least suggests that some caution is 
appropriate. Germany’s growth has been miserable during the last ten years, the country 
being the laggard of Europe next to Italy, and its standardized unemployment rate has 
risen from 8.0% to 9.5%. Given that Germany has very high social replacement 
incomes, which have made it a world champion in terms of the rate of unemployment 
among the unskilled (OECD 2002, 117, table A11.2), it seems quite possible that 
Germany would have done better without such high exports. Lower wages for the 
unskilled, determined by the forces of the market rather than the social preferences of 
government and unions, would have implied that more of the labour-intensive sectors of 
the economy had survived and that fewer jobs would have disappeared via outsourcing 
and offshoring. Value added in exports and export quantities would have been lower, 
but value added in upstream activities as well as other labour intensive parts of the 
economy would have stayed higher, more than compensating for the more moderate 
export performance. Growth and employment would have been higher because 
overspecialization, excessive capital exports and migration into unemployment could 
have been avoided.    17
 
Activating Social Assistance 
What is the policy conclusion following from this analysis? Some would say that the 
welfare state needs to be curtailed in order to reduce the high wage competition it exerts 
in the labour market so that wages become flexible and the economy is able to react 
efficiently to the forces of globalization. But that would mean giving up the European 
dream of an equitable society avoiding crime and social unrest, because it provides 
useful insurance against the multiple economic risks that the market economy 
encounters.  
  Arguably, a better, more feasible alternative is to make the welfare state’s 
redistributive activities compatible with wage flexibility. In principle, this is not 
difficult because instead of paying people for staying absent, the state could pay them 
for participating: it could provide wage subsidies to workers instead of wage 
replacement incomes. If the state pays wage subsidies, there is no lower bound on 
wages, as people do not need a wage that compensates for the loss of social benefits. On 
the contrary, they would be willing to accept very low wages knowing that the subsidy 
will be paid in addition to these wages, augmenting their incomes. The state’s role 
would be to give people, who are not productive enough to earn a subsistence minimum 
with their own work, a second income that is tailored to the individual circumstances so 
as to ensure that the subsistence minimum is not undercut.  
  The proposal follows the spirit of the American literature on this theme ranging 
from Haveman (1988) and Solow (1988) to Phelps (1994a, 1994b, 1997, 2000). 
However it is based on subsidies to individuals rather than their firms. In theory, both 
approaches lead to similar results when the market has reacted. However, since   18
individual subsidies can be tailored more easily to individual circumstances they may be 
a more efficient tool for targeting the poor.  
  One viable way of translating this idea into practice is the Ifo Institute’s system 
of Activating Social Assistance, modelled in part on the US Earned Income Tax Credit 
(Sinn et al., 2002 and  2006). Activating Social Assistance can best be understood as a 
reform of the existing welfare systems like the German Unemployment Benefit II or the 
Dutch Bystand. In Germany, a single individual without a job receives 670 euros from 
the state, in the Netherlands he receives 600 euros. If this individual takes up a job, he 
can earn up to 100 euros in Germany or up to 150 euros in the Netherlands without a 
withdrawal of transfers. Thereafter, in Germany, the transfer is cut by 80 cents for every 
additional euro earned, and in the Netherlands by a full euro, until the transfer has 
disappeared. It is clear that this is an insurmountable obstacle for the labour market, 
generating excessive wage demands that private employers can hardly meet.  
  According to Activating Social Assistance, not only 100 or 150 euros, 
respectively, would be free, but 500 euros. People could earn that much income by 
themselves without having to fear any transfer withdrawals. As a consequence, they 
would demand very low wages, and at low wages there are jobs.  
  Activating Social Assistance even means that the first 200 euros of earned 
income are subsidized at a rate of 20% such that the point at which the state pays most 
money to the individual is not where his own effort is zero. A minimum of effort has to 
be shown in order to receive the maximum state support. 
  In order for the system to be financially viable for the state, two additional 
measures are necessary. For one thing, beyond 500 euros the transfer has to be curtailed 
gradually. Here the withdrawal rate could be 70% or perhaps only 50% as the Scientific   19
Advisory Council at the Ministry of Economics has suggested (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Arbeit 2003). For another, the level of basic social assistance has to be 
cut. In the German case, a reduction by a third is necessary to keep the government 
budget balanced.  
  This new system is likely to provide the necessary wage flexibility for the 
unskilled to enable the economy to return to full employment. In the German case, 
wages for the unskilled are expected to fall by one third, with 3.2 million new jobs 
being created.  
  At least in Germany, a further provision of the system is required to ensure that 
no one who is needy can fall below the subsistence minimum even if he does not find a 
job in the private economy. This is communal jobs. In case of need, when no private job 
is found, everyone can demand employment with his local community providing him a 
wage for a full-time job equal to today’s social assistance or Bystand, for that matter. 
That is a wage of 600 euros in the Dutch case and 670 euros in the German case.  
  One may wonder how the local community could meaningfully employ all the 
people who might be coming. But the simple answer is loan labour. The community can 
use the private loan labour business, which is already well developed in the Netherlands, 
and lease its labour force to the private sector at a fee that is determined by supply and 
demand. And for sure, there will be a fee above zero, at which the bulk of the people 
who came to the communities can be leased successfully to private employers.  
  Augmented by communal loan labour contracts, the system offers two ways of 
wage subsidization. A direct way, where people themselves find employment in the 
private sector, and an indirect way, where they are employed in the private sector by the 
aid of local communities and loan employment firms. The incentive structure is   20
designed such that the first way is preferable. Despite the cut of the basic social 
assistance level, people can earn an overall income equal to the previous level of social 
assistance by working half-time in the private sector, and they can earn more than that 
by working more than half-time. If they rely on communal jobs, they have to work full- 
time for the same income.   
  Overall, Activating Social Assistance is a water-tight new polder system that 
both respects the social aims of the European welfare state and the needs of a market 
economy that struggles to survive the international low-wage competition brought about 
by globalization.  
  The old welfare state based on the idea of paying wage replacement incomes has 
come to its historical end. It represents an experiment of history that failed because it 
produced mass unemployment. It is becoming more and more obvious in these times 
how utopian that system really is. There is no way it can be maintained despite the 
forces of international factor price convergence. This suggests that a move towards a  
newa new welfare system that provides people a state income while they work may be 
the better alternative. Help for participating instead of for staying away would be its 
new slogan.   21
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